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THE ABOLITION OF DOWER: AN OCCASION
FOR RE-EXAMINING THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE'S* RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS
On January 1, 1972, the bill abolishing the age-old estate of dower
in Illinois took effect.' The passing of dower will alter many routine
aspects of the practice of law in Illinois. The complication of ascertain-
ing outstanding dower rights during title search will be eliminated.
Real estate transactions will be simplified since the signature of the
vendor's spouse will no longer be necessary for the conveyance of clear
title. No longer will the divorce lawyer concern himself with provid-
ing the financial equivalent of dower, and thus there will be a lesser
degree of contention in divorce settlements.
In a very important sense, however, the repeal of dower in Illinois
has broader significance. It affects directly the property interests of
the spouse2 which arise as a result of the marital relationship. The
abolition of the indefeasible protection3 of dower calls for reflection on
the public policy of Illinois with respect to the surviving spouse, review
of the actual benefits afforded by the state, and re-evaluation of current
statutory and case law in the area.
THE PROTECTION OFFERED BY DOWER AT COMMON LAW
Under the common law, a widow was entitled to an estate for life
in a third of the lands of which her husband had been seized in fee
simple and fee tail during the marriage. This estate for life was termed
her dower interest.4 While her husband lived, the wife possessed a
* Although this Note is directed at the problem of the widow's share in her
spouse's assets, the material discussed in the succeeding pages applies equally to the
surviving husband. As more and more women become financially self-sufficient and
accumulate substantial estates, the problem of the surviving widower may become more
acute.
1. House Bill Number 535, 77th General Assembly (1971).
2. Statistically, widows are much more prevalent than their male counter-parts.
In 1969, 3.6% of the male population over eighteen years of age were widowers. In
the same year 13.2% of females over eighteen were widows. (Statistical Abstract of the
United States (1970)). The problem of the widow is therefore of more real concern.
For a theoretical analysis of the necessity for providing for the widow qua widow see
MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE Wmow's SHARE (1960) [hereinafter cited as MACDONALD].
3. The right of dower was indefeasible since it could not be destroyed by any
unilateral act of the husband.
4. See generally, Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV.
L. REv. 42 (1948).
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mere expectancy, known as inchoate dower,5 which was contingent
upon her husband predeceasing her. Upon the death of her husband,
the wife's inchoate right of dower became consummate. The effect of
the consummation of her right was not to give her an estate in the land;
this did not occur until her dower was actually assigned and set off by
metes and bounds."
Common law dower provided a real protection to the wife since her
interest in the realty could not be defeated by an unilateral act of her
husband. He could not defeat her dower by inter-vivos transfer or by
will, although he could obtain a voluntary release of the right. The
primary function of common law dower was to insure a measure of eco-
nomic security to the widow, 7 although it often had the additional effect
of promoting family unity8 and protecting the social position of the
woman among the landed classes. In an age when real property was
the main source of wealth, common law dower admirably accomplished
its primary purpose.9 Since the great portion of the husband's fortune
was in realty, a one-third estate for life in his lands amply provided for
the wife in the event of his death.
Illinois codified the right of common law dower in section 18 of its
Probate Act.' Section 18 provided that a surviving spouse was en-
titled to a third part of all the real estate of which the decedent was
seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage. The
interest offered by section 18 differed from common law dower in two
important aspects: (1) the right to consummate dower vested only
when the right was perfected as provided in section 19,11 and (2) the
estate of dower was extended to both husband and wife.12
CONTEMPORARY VIABILITY OF THE ESTATE OF DOWER
In his Comentdries, Blackstone notes that dower proves to be a "clog
on alienations" and is "otherwise inconvenient to families."'" This in-
5. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 209 (1950).
6. Id.
7. Id. at § 217.
8. Since land was the chief source of subsistence, a widow would frequently have
been destitute without some rights in the land of her husband. The estate of dower
afforded support for the widow and the younger children who, because of primogeni-
ture, took no right in their father's land. Because of the widow's dower interest, she
and her younger children could remain on the land near the eldest son.
9. Note, Protection of the Surviving Spouse's Right Under Elective Statutory
Shares, 18 VAND. L. REV. 2090 (1965).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 18 (1969). See, In re Taylor's Will, 55 I11. 252 (1870)
for an excellent summary of the history of dower as it existed in the Northwest Terri-
tory and in the early days of Illinois statehood.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 18 (1969).
12. Id.
13. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136 (Andrews ed. 1896).
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convenience caused by the wife's dower interest, primarily related to the
alienability of real property, was considered justified when dower pro-
vided a significant benefit to her. In the present day context, how-
ever, there are many factors which lead legislatures to the conclusion
that dower is an insufficient protection, and is, therefore, outmoded.
Realistically, a life estate in one-third of a husband's realty does not
provide for the widow's needs. Land is no longer the primary source
of wealth in the United States.14 Our economy has been transformed
by the Industrial Revolution, which eliminated land as the chief form of
productive wealth. Today, securities and shares in industrial enter-
prises are the predominate forms of assets, and the average person owns
only a single residence. 15 Vast numbers die without owning any real
estate at all, and their estates will be composed of personal property
which dower does not reach.16
This reasoning however, is considerably weakened in Illinois and other
large agricultural states where many individuals still earn their living
off the land. 7 Indeed, a small farmer may possess little else than
his acreage; he is at least land rich. Dower, then, would seem to be of
value in states which still retain a large agrarian population.
The standard rejoinder is that a great portion of real estate is held in
forms to which dower does not apply.18 It is "black letter" law that a
widow has no dower interest in land of which her husband was seized
in joint tenancy with one other than his spouse.1 9 Upon the death of
the husband, his entire interest passes to the other co-tenant. 20  In Illi-
nois, there is an even more sophisticated method of holding real estate
free from any claim of dower known as the land trust.2 ' The husband
places his realty in the land trust naming himself beneficiary. The
14. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5 (A.J. Casher ed. 1952).
15. Id.
16. ATKINSON, WILLS § 30 (2d ed. 1953).
17. In 1960, 6.2% of the entire Illinois population lived on farms. There were
30,700,000 acres of land devoted to farming, roughly 80% of the total land area of
Illinois. There were 124,000 farms of the average size of 236 acres. (United States
Department of Agriculture, Illinois Agricultural Statistics 11 (1971)). A number of
states which have strong agricultural interests have refused to abandon common law
dower or its statutory equivalent. Laufer, Flexible Restraint on Testamentary Free-
dom, 69 HARv. L. REV. 277, 279 (1955).
18. See American Bar Association, Committee on Community Property and Jointly
Held Titles to Real Property, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law (1952);
Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancy, 51 IowA L. REV. 582 (1966); Garrett, Land
Trusts, 1955 U. ILL. L. FORUM 625, 655.
19. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.14 (A.J. Casher ed. 1952).
20. Id.
21. See generally, Garrett, Land Trusts, 1955 U. ILL. L. FORUM 625, 655; Garrett,
Recent Developments in Land Trust Law, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 467 (1961); Turner,
Some Legal Aspects o1 Beneficial Interests under Land Trusts, 39 ILL. L. REV. 216
(1945). The land trust is also utilized in Virginia, Florida, North Dakota and Indiana.
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trust is comprised of two basic instruments: a recorded deed in trust
and an unrecorded trust agreement. Although the recorded deed gives
the trustee full ownership of both legal and equitable titles, the trust
agreement limits his powers greatly.22 The trustee is given the authority
to convey the land upon the beneficiary's direction and to sell the prop-
erty at the end of twenty years. The beneficiary has the power to man-
age the property along with the right to receive rents, as well as the
proceeds of any mortgage or sale.2"
Illinois decisions have consistently held that the interest which the
beneficiary has in a land trust is not real property, but personal prop-
erty. -4  Since dower does not apply to personal property, - I the land
trust is an excellent device for evading the attachment of inchoate
dower. Yet the probability that the small farmer is even aware of the
existence of the land trust device is questionable. It is not unreason-
able, therefore, to assume that dower serves as a real protection to a
given number of the farming community. This assumption, however, is
often met with a practical criticism. Even if the husband's wealth were
to be in income producing realty to which dower applied, a one-third in-
terest for life is not enough to sustain the wife.
Insufficiency alone would not lead the legislature to seek the repeal
of section 18. Dower, however, produces adverse effects on the mar-
ketability of realty and the rights of creditors. The existence of dower
impedes free alienability of property. Because of dower, it was neces-
sary for the wife of the vendor to join in the transfer if clear title was to
be conveyed. If the vendee demanded unencumbered title, an unwilling
wife could effectively bar a sale.26 Dower also gave the surviving
spouse an interest in her husband's realty to the detriment of his credi-
tors.2 7  She was given preference over creditors28 on debts she may
have assisted in incurring and from which she probably benefited.29
The restraint on marketability of land which dower created, the tedi-
22. Note, Illinois Land Trusts, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 875 (1969); W. GARRETr,
LAND TRUSTS 1 (1971). Garrett, author of the Chicago Title and Trust Company's
pamphlet, LAND TRUSTS, reports that the land trust is widely used in Cook County and
is increasingly used in downstate Illinois.
23. id.
24. E.g., Seno v. Franke, 20 I11. 2d 70, 169 N.E.2d 335 (1960); Crawford Corp. v.
Woodlawn Bank, 382 Ill. 354, 47 N.E.2d 81 (1943); Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill.
528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
25. Clark v. Hanson, 320 Ill. 480, 151 N.E. 369 (1926).
26. T. ATKINSON, supra note 16.
27. Welch, Should Dower Be Abolished in Illinois?, 42 CHICAGO B. RECORD 435
(1961).
28. ILL. REV. STA'r. ch. 3 § 23 (1969).
29. The most common example of such a debt was the mortgage the husband exe-
cuted on the home where the couple resided.
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ous element dower injected into title search, and the hardship dower
placed on creditors of the decedent have led the legislature to conclude
its continued existence was inadvisable. 0  It has determined that the
retention of dower generates problems disproportionate to the function
it serves. But it has abolished dower without providing the surviving
spouse with any similarly indefeasible protection.
EXISTING STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE IN ILLINOIS
On January 1, 1972, Illinois joined an ever-increasing number of
states that have eliminated common law dower." 1 Since the Illinois
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that inchoate dower is not a vested
right and may be changed or eliminated by the legislature, 2 no reason-
able constitutional attack on the law appears likely. A re-assessment of
the remaining statutory protections for the spouse is thus in order.
30. See Note, Does Dower Pay Its Way in Illinois?, 1956 U. ILL. L. FORUM 487
(1956) for a study of dower litigation in the Illinois courts from 1941 to 1956. The
investigation reveals that little economic advantage accrued to the surviving spouse as a
result of election of dower and that only a few creditors or bona fide purchasers of
land were injured by the election. The author concludes the real impact of dower is its
effect on the marketability of land and the bothersome element it injects into title
search.
31. E.g., Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
House Bill Number 535 amended section 18 of the Probate Act (ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 3 (1969)) by abolishing the inchoate right of the spouse to take dower. As modified,
section 18 reads, "[T]here is no estate of dower or courtesy. All inchoate rights to
elect or take dower existing on the effective date of this amendatory act are hereby ex-
tinguished." Other sections of the Probate Act are amended to conform to the modifi-
cations in section 18. Section 11, which deals with intestate distribution, is amended
to omit provisions relating to the descent of property upon election of the surviving
spouse to take dower. Section 16, which provides the surviving spouse with a forced
share upon renunciation of a will, is similarly modified. Section 12 is altered to delete
the provision for descent if the surviving spouse of the illegitimate elects dower. Sec-
tions 19 through 40, which deal with the manner of electing and assigning dower, are
all repealed. Section 223 of the Probate Act, giving the personal representative of a
ward the right to join in the execution and delivery of a deed or mortgage, is modified
to omit any reference to dower, as is section 230. (Section 230 specifies those persons
who are necessary parties to proceedings to sell or mortgage real estate of a decedent or
ward.) Section 234(d), which authorizes the court to sell or mortgage a decedent's
or ward's real estate to decree the assignment of dower or order payment in its
money's worth, is deleted. Companion Acts, which were signed by the Governor on
July 23, 1971, eliminate all references to dower in various other statutes. (House Bill
Number 536, amending ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 30, par. 18 (1969) (Conveyances Act);
House Bill 537, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30 § 99 (1969) (Torrens Act); House
Bill Number 539, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30 §§ 17, 21 (1969) (Husband
and Wife Act); House Bill 540, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82 § 1 (1969)
(Mechanics Lien Act); 541 amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 § 23.1 (1969) (Mortgage
and Foreclosure Act); House Bill Number 542, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 §§ 45,
51, 55, 59, 67 (1969) (Partition Act); House Bill Number 543, amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 106% § 25 (1969) (Partnership Act).
32. McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N.E. 681 (1892); Schollkopf v. DeVry,
366 Ill. 39, 7 N.E.2d 757 (1937); Classen v. Heath, 389 111. 183, 58 N.E.2d 889 (1945).
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"There is a glaring inconsistency in our law which compels a man to
support his wife during his lifetime and permits him to leave her practi-
cally penniless at his death.""3  Motivated by the desire to remedy the
inconsistency, many states have enacted legislation granting the widow
a right to elect a portion of the estate, personal and real, which her
husband possesses at his death. 4 Typically, the estate is one in fee
and not merely a life interest.3" Regardless of efforts by the decedent
to prevent it by his will, the wife is entitled to claim a minimum percen-
tage of his estate. This statutory minimum is known as the forced
share.
Illinois case law proclaims that the state is very solicitous of the
widow's position. The public policy of the state was clearly expressed
in an early Illinois decision:
We do not go too far when we say that it has become a sort of com-
mon law in this State, that support shall be "in all cases," one-third
of the husband's real estate for life, and one-third of the personal es-
tate forever, which shall remain after the payment of debts, un-
less the husband shall by his last will and testament make some
devise or bequest to her, which she is willing to accept. 36
Indeed, a later court recognized a conscious desire on the part of Illinois
lawmakers "to provide for the support of the wife, not only during the
lifetime of the husband, but also after his death. '37
Sections 11 and 16 of the Probate Act would seem to substantiate
the state's concern for the plight of the widow. 38  Section 11 provides
the surviving spouse with one-third of all the estate, depending on the
existence of children, should the husband die intestate. Section 16 per-
mits the wife to elect against the will of her husband, and claim one-half
or one-third of his estate.
There has been general dissatisfaction with the statutory share con-
cept, however,39 and the typical arguments marshalled against it are
33. The Report of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates,
New York Legislative Document No. 69, at 86 (1930).
34. Also, in the eight community property states, the surviving spouse is entitled to
half of the property which he or she once owned together with the deceased spouse.
The intricacies of community property law are beyond the scope of this article. See
generally, Wren, The Widow's Election in Community Property States, 7 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 (1965).
35. See, for each state, 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 189, 216 (1935);
2 PRENTICE HALL WILLS, ESTATES & TRUSTS SERVICE § 2735 (1969).
36. In re Taylor's Will, 55 Ill. 252, 259 (1870).
37. Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 129, 84 N.E. 192, 196 (1908).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 11, 16 (1969).
39. See generally, MACDONALD; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PENN.
L. REV. 139 (1936); Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform,
52 GEO. L.J. 499 (1964); Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 RocKy MT.
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good in Illinois. Sections 11 and 16 of the Illinois Probate Act apply
only to the property owned by the decedent at the time of death.4" The
protection offered by the Illinois statute is often an illusion, since it does
not prevent evasive depletion of the estate by inter-vivos transfer. The
utility of sections 11 and 16 is slight since they can be easily circumvent-
ed by a number of devices readily available to the husband. Should he
dispose of his entire estate during life, the widow's interest is successfully
defeated. One-third or one-half of nothing is nothing. The ineffective-
ness of such a statutory share provision has prompted one writer to de-
clare that "only the poor and the stupid need conform."41  In reality,
sections 11 and 16 pay only so much lip service to the stated policy of
Illinois. The repeal of dower thus removes the only indefeasible protec-
tion for the spouse provided by the Probate Act.
There is a clear inconsistency between the little security the state pro-
vides to the spouse whose marriage terminates because of death and the
important measures it provides for the spouse whose marriage ends on
account of divorce. Illinois recognizes the husband's obligation to sup-
port his wife while he lives,42 and in the event of divorce, it is recog-
nized that the wife has a right to an equitable share in her husband's
property.4 3 The share may be in the form of alimony or property set-
tlement 44 and is a matter of great significance in the negotiations sur-
rounding the disolution of a marriage. Either because of conscious
design or legislative inertia, the lawmakers of this state have not pro-
vided similar means to insure support of the wife upon the death of her
husband.
As of January 1, the widow has only her statutory share, homestead
exemption 45 and surviving spouse's award46 to support her in the years
following her husband's death. Even with the surviving spouse award
increased to $5,000, the sum of the award and homestead exemption
will be inadequate to sustain her. She should be entitled to a portion
of the net estate which cannot be defeated by the husband. In Illinois,
L. REV. 506 (1957); Simes, Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead
Hand, 26 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1957).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. § 11, 16 (1969).
41. Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PENN. L. REV. 139 (1936).
42. Banck v. Banck, 322 Ill. App. 369, 54 N.E.2d 577 (1944); Stewart v. Stewart,
1 Il1. App. 2d 283, 117 N.E.2d 579 (1954).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 19 (1969).
44. Id.
45. House Bill 538, approved July 23, 1971, increases the Homestead Exemption
to $10,000.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 § 178 (1969). The minimum Surviving Spouse Award is
$5,000 with an additional sum not less than $1,000 for each child. House Bill Number
1275, which increased the minimum award to $5,000, was signed by the Governor in
1971, and is effective July 1, 1972.
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the burden of insuring the widow a portion of her husband's estate has
been on the judiciary, and the widow has consistently failed in attempts
to reach property which had been transferred by her husband during
life. Transfers to defeat her statutory share have been generally effective.
As the court has struggled with each particular device, it has used various
rationales to arrive at the typical result.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS SUSTAINING INTER-VIvoS TRANSFERS
4 7
A. Gifts48
In Illinois, a gift inter-vivos will successfully defeat the rights of the
widow in the object of the gift. The gift must be real, however.49  In
other words, it must be a valid gift under personal property law. The
fact that the express purpose of the gift is to defeat the statutory marital
rights of the surviving spouse is immaterial. The decision in Haskell v.
Art Institute of Chicago articulates the position of the Illinois courts:
The law is well settled that a husband may dispose absolutely of
his property during his lifetime even though he intended to deprive
his wife of her right to take one-half of such property where she
renounces the provisions of the will. If the gift or disposition of
the property, however, is but a scheme of the husband to deprive
the wife of her property rights at the same time retaining the bene-
fits of the property himself during his lifetime, the transaction may
be set aside. If the title to the paintings passed from the husband
to the Art Institute, then, regardless of what his intentions were
there was no fraud practiced on the wife.50
The Haskell court made no attempt to reconcile its holding with the
state's alleged concern for the surviving spouse. 51
It is only under unusual circumstances that a real gift inter-vivos will
be set aside in favor of the widow's statutory share. When the gift
inter-vivos is made in contemplation of impending death with the
intent to defeat the wife's marital rights, and the gift comprises the bulk
of the husband's estate, the transfer will be vulnerable to attack by the
47. Annotations: 49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1956); 157 A.L.R. 1164 (1944); 112 A.L.R.
649 (1938); 64 A.L.R. 466 (1930).
48. Epstein, Inter-vivos Transfers: Gifts, Joint Ownerships, and Contemplation of
Death, 1949 U. ILL. L. FORUM 18 (1949).
49. See, Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E.2d 736
(1940). Here the husband, who owned a valuable art collection, entered into a writ-
ten contract by which he purported to transfer and deliver forty paintings to the Art
Institute. The Institute's Board of Trustees accepted the gift but agreed to leave the
pictures in the possession of the husband for a period of a year. He died during the
one year period never having relinquished possession.
50. Id. at 398, 26 N.E.2d at 739.
51. See text beginning p. 99 supra.
1972
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 3: 94
wife. 52  In the absence of these circumstances, the gift inter-vivos will
successfully defeat her interest.
A gift causa mortis is a revocable gift of personalty made in appre-
hension of imminent death.53  Title passes immediately to the donee of
a gift causa mortis, although the transfer is subject to revocation. Be-
cause the nature of the gift is so nearly testamentary, it is treated by the
court much like the gift inter-vivos which is made in contemplation of
death. Dicta in three Illinois cases indicates that conformity to prop-
erty law alone will not sustain a gift causa mortis against the claim of a
surviving spouse. "4  Reality of the gift is not enough; it appears a gift
causa mortis will be per se vulnerable to the widow's claim.
55
B. Revocable Living Trusts56
Although Illinois has determined that an irrevocable inter-vivos trust
is good against any claim of the widow,5 the device is not particularly
attractive to the husband who seeks to disinherit his wife by transfer
during his life, since he must relinquish too many of the incidents of
ownership in the trust property. The revocable living trust, however,
is an ideal way for the husband to accomplish his desire, since the settlor
retains so many powers over the trust res.
Illinois is particularly liberal in sustaining the validity of revocable
inter-vivos trusts.5" In Farkas v. Williams,59 the settlor directed that
certain shares of stock be issued in his name as trustee for the bene-
ficiary. He reserved the right to receive all dividends during his life-
time, to vote the stock, to change the beneficary and to revoke the trust.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the retention of these powers did
not make the trust invalid and found that it was a good revocable living
trust.
Illinois has followed the New York courts in determining whether or
not the living trust is good against the surviving spouse. In the cele-
52. Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908).
53. See MACDONALD at 194.
54. West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 633 (1935);
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); Delta & Pine
Land Co. v. Benton, 171 Ill. App. 635 (1912).
55. Id.
56. See MACDONALD for an exhaustive survey of the status of the revocable living
trust in the fifty states. See also, Hayes, Illinois Dower and the "Illusory" Trust, 2
DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1952), for a study of this device in Illinois.
57. West v. Miller, 78 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied 296 U.S. 633 (1935).
58. E.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Bear v. Milikin
Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E.
615 (1899).
59. 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
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brated case of Newman v. Dore,6 ° a New York decision, the husband
created an inter-vivos trust of all his property three days before his
death. He retained the right to revoke, an income for life, and control
over the powers granted to the trustee. The widow was given no bene-
ficial interest in the property. The court assumed, without deciding,
that the trust was a valid trust under New York law.6 In determining
whether the trust would be good against the surviving spouse, the New
York Court of Appeals enunciated the following test:
[We must ask] whether the husband has in good faith divested
himself of ownership of his property or has made an illusory trans-
fer. 62
The trust here was found to be illusory with respect to the widow. The
conveyance was said to be "intended only as a mask for the effective re-
tention by the settlor of the property which in form he had con-
veyed."
63
Illinois has adopted New York's "illusory" test in the case of Smith
v. Northern Trust Co.,64 which specifically cites Newman v. Dore. Dur-
ing his life, Smith transferred into trust all his assets with the exception
of his pension. The three powers retained by the settlor in Newman v.
Dore were also retained by Smith: the trust was revocable, the settlor
retained a life estate, and the trustees were subject to his control. After
Smith's death, there was nothing with which to pay Mrs. Smith the
widow's award or statutory share. Although the trust probably would
have qualified as valid under Illinois trust law,6 ' the trust was said to
be illusory as to the widow and a fraud on her marital rights. 6 The
court found that the transfer to the trustee, "although absolute in form,
was merely colorable and illusory."67  As a result, the trust property
was subject to her claim for widow's award and statutory share.
The decision in Smith v. Northern Trust appears on its face to be a
great step toward subjecting inter-vivos transfers to the wife's elective
share. Actually, the Illinois courts have limited the Smith holding to
the precise combination of circumstances found in the case, and have
60. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
63. Id.
64. 322 11. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944).
65. See cases cited note 58, supra.
66. Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Il. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); Dennis
v. Dennis, 271 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. 1971); Burnet v. First National Bank, 12 Ill.
App. 2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1957).
67. Id.
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not sought to extend it. In Burnet v. First National Bank,", the set-
tlor retained the power to revoke, a life estate in the income, and the
right to control the trustees; after the settlor's death the wife was to re-
ceive a life estate in the net income. By subsequent amendment, how-
ever, the spouse was to be paid $100 a month while the settlor lived.
In addition, the trust was altered to give the trustee the right to make
any sale or investment. The court commented that this situation was
factually distinguishable from Smith.6" In addition, the charges of un-
due influence and misrepresentation that the court felt were present in
Smith, were absent. Determining that the evidence negatived any in-
tent by the donor to defraud the widow's rights, the court did not allow
her to reach the trust property.70
Illinois does not extend the doctrine of illusory transfer to a revocable
living trust which is later made irrevocable by amendment. In Den-
nis v. Dennis,71 the wife was not left penniless, having been given prop-
erty of the value of $27,000 under a will. In addition, considerable
other property was passed by will which could be reached by her by
election under section 16 of the Probate Act."2 The doctrine of Smith
v. Northern Trust was not extended to this irevocable trust. These two
recent cases are illustrative of the reluctance of the Illinois courts to ex-
tend the protection of Smith.
C. Totten Trusts
A savings account trust, or Totten Trust, is made by the deposit by
one person of his own money in trust for another.73  The beneficiary
is paid upon the death of the depositor. It is a tentative trust since it is
revocable at will.74  The settlor of a Totten Trust has a life interest,
can control the trust by withdrawing funds at will, and retains the power
to revoke. These are the three elements in Newman v. Dare7 5 that
made the inter-vivos transfer illusory with respect to the surviving
spouse. To be consistent with its holding in the Newman case, the
New York court should have allowed a surviving spouse to reach the
proceeds of a Totten Trust. Yet in In Re Halpern's Estate,7 the New
68. 12 I11. App. 2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1957).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 271 N.E.2d 55 (Mll. App. 1971).
72. Id.
73. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
74. Id.
75. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
76. 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
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York Court of Appeals upheld the effectiveness of the Totten Trust
against the claims of the widow.
Although the court did not specifically reverse its decision in New-
man, it held that it had no power to divide up a valid trust, and call it
illusory for one purpose and real for another. A trust is illusory only
if it is totally invalid." Thus, the wife can be successfully disinherited
if the trust is effective as a trust,r" and the Halpern. court held that the
Totten Trust operated as such an effective inter-vivos transfer.
The decision in Halpern thus appears to weaken considerably the
Newman holding. There have been attempts to distinguish Halpern on
the grounds that the court meant to deal specifically with the popular
Totten Trust device. 79 Another possible approach is that Halpern var-
ies procedurally from Newman, since the spouse in Halpern failed
timely to renounce the will.8° Regardless of its effect on Newman, In
Re Halpern's Estate limits the effectiveness of the "illusory" test as a
protection to the surviving spouse.
Illinois has recognized the validity of the savings account trust.8 '
Given the increasing importance of this type of trust in the estate of the
average person, 2 it is doubtful that Illinois will extend its holding in
Smith v. Northern Trust to the Totten Trust. As a policy matter, al-
lowing the spouse to reach the Totten Trust would upset the testamen-
tary intentions of numerous persons. In addition, the Illinois decision,
Smith, is expressly based on the New York holding of Newman. To the
extent that the Newman test has been abandoned with respect to Totten
Trusts, consistency demands that Illinois not employ the Smith decision as
a basis for allowing the surviving spouse any interest in Totten Trusts.
D. Joint Tenancy in Realty
Real property which the husband holds in joint tenancy with one
other than his wife is another attractive way to evade the widow's share.
This method of inter-vivos disposition of wealth resembles the revoca-
ble living trust, since the husband retains virtually full, unimpaired in-
cidents of ownership. Illinois courts have held that valid joint tenancy
77. Id. In Newman, however, the court assumed the trust was valid but termed it
illusory as to the surviving spouse.
78. Id.
79. Simes, Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead Hand, 26
U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1957).
80. See Hayes, supra note 56, at 24.
81. In re Estate of Petralia, 32 Il. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965), afj'g 48 Ill.
App. 2d 122, 198 N.E.2d 200 (1965).
82. MACDONALD at 206.
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in real estate will defeat the rights of the surviving spouse. In Hoeff-
ner v. Hoeffner,s' the widow attempted to reach realty which her hus-
band held in joint tenancy with his daughter by a previous marriage.
The court determined that a valid joint tenancy had been created under
Illinois law. By operation of law, the daughter became absolute owner
upon the death of her father,"4 and the widow could have no claim to
the real property:
The property in litigation was owned by joint tenants, and it is
elemental that a joint tenancy estate is not an estate of inherit-
ance, the joint owner first dying has no interest which he can de-
vise, and the title to the property held in joint tenancy passes to
his survivor, as here, independently of the claims of the wife.85
E. Joint Bank Accounts
The joint bank account is as popular as the Totten Trust as a teste-
mentary substitute, and, like the Totten Trust, is invulnerable to attack
by the widow.8 6  To create a joint bank account, the Illinois Statutes
require that the specific words of survivorship be used. 7 These words
are part of the contract between the bank and the two co-tenants. Al-
though a gift law justification may be used, 8 it is because of this con-
tract of survivorship that Illinois refuses to permit invasion of the ac-
count by the surviving spouse. 9 Such was the holding in the case of
Holmes v. Mims."0 Here, the survivorship contract entered into by the
husband and a third party was found to be valid and enforceable, and
therefore beyond the scope of any claim by the widow.
The wife's chance of any claim to the joint bank account is non-exist-
ent unless she can prove that no joint tenancy in fact existed. In
Hamilton v. First State Bank of Willow Hill, the widow reached the
account because the validity of the joint tenancy could not be sustained
on either a contract or gift rationale.91
F. United States Savings Bonds and Life Insurance
United States Treasury Regulations provide that Savings Bonds may
be issued to a sole owner, to two persons as co-owners, or in the name of
83. 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 263, 59 N.E.2d at 689.
86. MACDONALD at 214.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76 § 2 (1969).
88. Milewski v. Milewski, 351 Ill. App. 158, 114 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
89. Holmes v. Mims, I III. 2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953).
90. Id.
91. Hamilton v. First State Bank, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929).
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one person, payable on his death to another designated beneficiary. 92
Issuance of the bond in co-owner or beneficiary form can serve as an ef-
fective will substitute, which will put the bonds beyond the reach of
the widow.9"
In Levites v. Levites,94 the husband purchased a number of Series E
United States Savings Bonds payable to himself and various children,
grandchildren, and great-grandchildren in co-owner form. The widow
sought to reach the bonds after the death of her husband, but the court
determined that upon issuance of the bonds in co-owner form the co-
owners acquired a present interest.95 On the basis of Federal Treasury
Regulations, the interest of the co-owners ripened into absolute own-
ership upon the death of Levites, and his widow had no claim to the
bonds. 6 The husband's intent to defraud his widow was irrelevant, 97
since title passed under the terms of the survivorship agreement with
the United States Government. No Illinois case deals directly with an
United States bond issued in the name of beneficiary payable on death,
but it is fair to assume that such a bond would receive similar treatment
by the Illinois courts.
Life insurance, payable to one other than the widow, is another po-
tential means of evasion. By Illinois case decision, life insurance is not
considered an asset of the decedent's estate unless the p.o.d. beneficiary
is the decedent himself, his executors, or administrators. 9  It would ap-
pear that life insurance, payable to a third party, is per se unreachable
by the widow.
In only a few instances has the spouse ever attempted to reach the
proceeds of life insurance, since it appears to be immune from her at-
tack.99 In a leading New York case, 10 the court refused to include the
proceeds as a part of the husband's estate so that the widow could claim
her distributive share.
92. 31 CODE FED. REG. § 315.60 (1971).
93. See, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) which held that the Supremacy Clause
embraced the Treasury Regulations governing survivorship of bonds registered in co-
ownership form. State property law which conflicted with the right of survivorship was
superseded by federal law.
94. 27 Ill. App. 2d 274, 169 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 356 Il1. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934),
aff'g 268 Ill. App. 518 (1932); Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Collins et al, 341
Ill. 548, 173 N.E. 465 (1930).
99. MACDONALD at 238.
100. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 290 N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943).
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STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH FRAUD
ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE
The previous discussion of case law illustrates that no satisfactory cri-
teria have been developed to determine whether an inter-vivos transfer
should be set aside in favor of the spouse's statutory share.'' The
Illinois courts are greatly limited in their decisions because they must
work within the framework of the statutory share, which applies only to
property owned at death. This share is essentially a product of the
nineteenth century, an age in which there was less inter-vivos property
transmission.' Today the emphasis is on inter-vivos dispositive de-
vices, 10 3 yet the judiciary receives no statutory direction in applying the
provisions of section 11 and section 16 of the Probate Act to nonpro-
bate assets.
In recent years, numerous statutory schemes have been developed
to insure the surviving spouse a share in nonprobate assets. The Illinois
legislature would have ample guidance were it to attempt to modernize
the state's provisions for the widow.
A. Statutes which Extend the Forced Share to Inter-Vivos Transfers
A number of plans have been devised which have specifically ex-
tended the statutory share to particular categories of inter-vivos transfer.
These statutes have the advantage of objectivity, and provide estate
planners with a firm basis on which to advise their clients.
1. The Pennsylvania Statute
Pennsylvania was one of the first states to expand the scope of the
forced share by statute.10 4  By election, the surviving spouse may treat
as testamentary any property conveyed by the decedent to the extent
the decedent retained a power of appointment, revocation, or consump-
tion over the principal.' While the law is undoubtedly a step in the
right direction, 0 6 there is an inherent problem due to the wording of
the statute. Terms such as "conveyance of assets" and "power of con-
101. See generally, MACDONALD, ch. 22; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U.
PA. L. REV. 139 (1936); Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform,
52 GEO. L.J. 499 (1964); Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA.
L. REV. 157 (1960).
102. MAcDONALD at 271.
103. Id.
104. 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 301.11 (1950) (Estate Act of 1947) as amended 1956,
P.L. (1955) No. 374, § 4.
105. Id.
106. MACDONALD at 143.
Vol. 3: 94
The Abolition of Dower
sumption" are subject to various interpretations, and the Pennsylvania
Act fails to define them. It is not surprising, then, that there is uncer-
tainty as to the statute's coverage. 10
7
2. The New York Statute
In 1954, New York adopted a comprehensive statute which em-
braced the Pennsylvania approach, but extended it to cover specific
inter-vivos transactions.108  It provides a list of those nonprobate assets
which can be included in the net estate against which the spouse may
claim. The New York statute treats as testamentary dispositions all
gifts causa mortis, money on deposit by the decedent in trust for an-
other, money deposited in the decedent's name payable on death to an-
other, joint tenancy property, and transfers by the decedent over which
he has a power to revoke or invade. 10 9 Any of these testamentary sub-
stitutes received by the wife are to be creditied against her elective
share." 0  Thus, the statute attempts to take into consideration the fi-
nancial status of the wife herself. New York expressely excludes life
insurance, pension plans, and United States Savings Bonds from the
coverage of its law. While the devices by which a husband can dis-
inherit his wife are restricted, they are not eliminated entirely. A man
intent on pauperizing his widow could convert the bulk of his assets into
the exempted areas of insurance, pensions, and United States Savings
Bonds."'
3. The Uniform Probate Code
The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code" 2 were undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the New York experience. The spouse is given a right to
claim one-third of an augmented estate. The augmented estate is the
estate at death reduced by funeral expenses, cost of administration, all
claims of creditors, homestead allowances, family allowances and ex-
107. Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's
Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REV. 513
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
108. N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUST LAws § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
109. Id. The adoption of this statute renders the furor over Newman v. Dore and
In re Halpern moot in New York. The law includes revocable living trusts and
savings bank trusts in the net estate against which the spouse may claim.
110. Id.
111. CLARK at 531.
112. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, PRENTICE-HALL, WILLS, ESTATES, TRUSTS, REPORT
BULLETIN 6 § 2-202 (August 27, 1969). In 1962, a committee of the Real Property,
Probate and Trust section of the ABA combined with the National Conference on
Uniform State Laws to produce the Uniform Probate Code. It was approved by the
American Bar Association in August of 1969.
1972
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 3: 94
emptions plus the value of: any incomplete gifts, revocable trusts, any
gifts made within two years of decedent's death to the extent that the
aggregate transfers made to any one donee in either of the years exceed
$3,000, and any property the decedent has transferred without adequate
consideration to another and to himself as joint tenants.113 The pro-
ceeds of life and accident insurance and of an annuity or pension are not
included as a part of the augmented estate only if the beneficiary is one
other than the surviving spouse. 114  Under the Uniform Probate Code,
the husband could still conceivably disinherit his wife by transferring
his assets into any of these exempted categories." 5
The Uniform Probate Code requires that the widow's share of the
augmented estate be reduced by any testamentary substitutes received
by the surviving spouse. She must account for practically everything
she received from her husband during his life: the classification of the
testamentary substitutes received by the spouse is broader than that
used to determine the augmented estate. The Code provides that her
share of the augmented estate be reduced by the amount of any inter-
vivos trust, life insurance proceeds of which she is the beneficiary, gifts,
joint tenancies and the commuted value of any pensions and retirement
plans."1 6 The inclusion of life insurance and pensions here is not unrea-
sonable. It would be expected that the wife would very frequently bene-
fit from life insurance and pension plans and therefore, she is required
to account for them. On the other hand, the Uniform Probate Code
specifically excludes from the augmented estate annuity, pension and
life insurance plans with non-spouse beneficiaries. The drafters prob-
ably considered them an unlikely device by which to disinherit the wife.
Like the New York statute, the Code seeks to prevent the spouse
from disturbing testamentary provisions or inter-vivos transfers where
she has been adequately provided for.117 Furthermore, the Code gives
additional scope and flexibility to the inquiry into the wife's financial po-
sition." 8
B. Plans Which Provide a Flexible Restraint on Inter-Vivos Transfers
The preceding statutes all attempt to protect the widow by enlarging
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. CLARK at 538.
116. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202.
117. Ideally, the competing right of the husband to transfer his property will be
superseded only if necessary for the support of the wife. In 1936, Professor Edmund
Cahn proposed that certain inter-vivos transfers be deemed voidable. They would be
set aside only if the probate estate proved insufficient. Cahn, Restraints on Disin-
heritance, 85 U. PENN. L. REV. 139 (1936).
118. CLARK at 539.
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the scope of the probate estate to which her statutory share can be ap-
plied.'19 A different approach is to be found in those schemes which
do not attempt to update the traditional statutory share.
1. The Wisconsin Statute
A recent Wisconsin law120 rejects the idea of including nonprobate
assets as subject to the elective share. Instead, it reaches only those
deliberate plans which deplete the probate estate in an attempt to de-
feat election by the surviving spouse. Wisconsin's statute does not sub-
ject any nonprobate assets to her elective share as a general rule. The
widow can reach such assets only if she can prove in a proceeding
in equity that a transfer was made for the "primary purpose" of defeat-
ing her marital rights. 12' Although such a law is flexible and infringes
only minimally on the husband's property rights, it is hardly an im-
provement on the "illusory" transfer test. The meaning of "primary
purpose" in the statute is ambiguous, and consequently, the statute pro-
vides no assurance of what will be considered testamentary by the
courts.121 In addition, even if it is possible to define "primary pur-
pose" by means of a workable standard, proving the essential elements
of such a standard would be a difficult task.
2. Support Statutes
Effective restraints on disinheritance necessitate interference with the
power of testation and the power to make inter-vivos transfers. The
New York statute and Uniform Probate Code go a long way in taking
into consideration the financial status of the spouse, but they fail to deal
with wealth the wife may have acquired from sources other than trans-
fer by her husband. Under the augmented estate concept, a finan-
cially independent woman can unnecessarily upset numerous inter-vivos
transfers.
Great Britain has attempted to deal with this very problem by limiting
the surviving spouse's share to what is actually needed. Much of the
119. See also, Simes, Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead
Hand, 26 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1957) for a suggestion that the surviving spouse reach
those transfers considered testamentary under Federal estate tax law.
120. W.S.A. 861.17 (1969). In the comments following this provision, the draft-
ers of the Wisconsin statute specifically reject, "at least for the time being," the ap-
proach taken by Pennsylvania and New York. The test of primary purpose, they feel,
has the advantage of familiarity.
121. Id.
122. See generally, Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 277 (1955).
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attractiveness of the British Family Maintenance legislation12" is that it
is sensistive to the individual requirements of the widow. The British
statute authorizes the courts to award maintenance payments out of
the decedent's estate to those who qualify as dependents; the surviving
spouse is one such dependent. Payments are not based on any fixed
fractional part of the estate as is the American custom. Rather, the
amount is to be determined by the court. 124  In making the award, the
court is to consider the interests of the persons who otherwise would be
entitled to the property concerned, the financial position of the applicant,
the testator's reasons for his dispositions, and any other circumstances
that the court deems relevant. 12- Naturally, the British support statute
places a great burden on the court, and it increases the likelihood of
litigation. 126  On the other hand, the actual instances in which the hus-
band attempts to disinherit his wife are probably infrequent,'127 so
the actual burden is not as great as it first appears. In 1971, the state of
Oregon adopted a statute nearly identical to the British Maintenance
legislation. 128  Such a law is not without defects. Both the British and
Oregon provisions are as vulnerable to inter-vivos transfers as is the
widow's share under the typical American statute, 29 since the source of
maintenance payments is only the probate estate. In his monumental
work, Fraud on the Widow's Share,3 ' W.D. MacDonald suggests a
Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Act which seeks to buttress the
basic British notion of reasonable support with anti-evasion provisions.' 3 '
123. 1 & 2 GEo. 6, ch. 45 (1938).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. MACDONALD at 292.
127. In the "Chicago" study of the Probate Court of Cook County, based on a
sample of 99 estates of testators who died in 1953 and 73 estates of testators who died
in 1957, it was found that 100% of the testators who left a spouse and children deviated
from the intestate distribution scheme. 100% of the decedents left all their property
to the surviving spouse. Durham, The Method, Process, and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 252 (1962). A sample of 84 Illinois
attorneys who participated in a total of 1,513 probate proceedings revealed that where
there was a surviving spouse, there was need for protection from disinheritance in less
than 2% of the cases. Plager, The Spouse's Share: A Solution In Search of a Problem,
33 U. CI. L. REV. 681, 712 (1966). The statistics offered by Durham and Plager are
certainly not conclusive since both authors base their findings on samples which repre-
sent only a fraction of the total number of estates probated in Illinois each year.
128. O.R.S. 114.015 (1971). Unlike the British statute, the Oregon law gives the
surviving spouse priority over creditors. The court is limited to taking one-half of
the estate for support if it appears the estate will be insolvent.
129. MACDONALD at 294.
130. Id. at 299-327.
131. Certain defined inter-vivos transfers may be reached by the surviving spouse or
child in the event the estate of the decedent is inadequate for their maintenance.
The transferee may be liable to contribute only if the transfer was unreasonably large
at the time it was made under the circumstances then obtaining, and only in an
amount in excess of what would have constituted a reasonable transfer. The trans-
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CONCLUSION
Illinois' oft proclaimed concern for the surviving spouse"' is at odds
with the actual protection the state provides for her. The passing of
dower calls attention to the glaring inconsistency between public policy
and objective reality. Because of the ease with which the husband may
deplete his estate, sections 11 and 16 of the Probate Act are virtually
ineffectual. Illinois case law has consistently sustained inter-vivos
transfers which accomplish this depletion; some statutory change would
appear to be called for.
Although a flexible support statute holds considerable appeal, its very
flexibility is its drawback. The estate planner would be unable to ad-
vise his client with certainty that the latter's transfers would be upheld
after his death. Conversely, Section 2-202 of the Uniform Probate
Code is painfully precise and is based on the more traditional notion of
the one-third elective share. Under the Uniform Probate Code, the
certainty of estate planning would be enhanced. The Uniform Pro-
bate Code has been recently adopted by the neighboring state of Michi-
gan and should certainly be given careful attention by the Illinois legis-
lature.
Inherent in the state's abolition of dower is the importance attached
to the free transferability of property. Under present Illinois law, the
rights of the surviving spouse are clearly subordinate. Certainly, the
dower right is not today's solution to the problem of the surviving
spouse. Yet in Illinois it at least served as an indefeasible protection
to some people under some circumstances. The legislature has sum-
marily repealed this protection without providing an indefeasible es-
tate to meet contemporary needs. Only by some change in the present
statutory share will the legislature fulfill what is purported to be its
goal:
. . . to provide for the support of the wife, not only during the
lifetime of the husband, but also after his death.133
ANN ELLEN ACKER
feree shall not be required to contribute if the transfer was made more than three
years prior to the transferor's death provided the decedent retained no beneficial interest
in the transferred property.
132. Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908). In re Taylor's Will,
55 11. 252 (1870).
133. Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908).
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